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EXPLOITING LATIN AMERICAN
MICROFINANCE DEREGULATION: ONE
BORROWER AT A TIME
ABTRACT
Microfinance seeks to eradicate poverty through the economic growth
and development that results when seed capital is given to microenterprises.
In 2015, Latin America’s microfinance loan portfolio totaled $40 billion
USD and included more than twenty-two million borrowers. Due to the
current state of microfinance in the region—abusive lending practices and
betraying the original goal and purpose of eradicating poverty—this Note
advocates for a regional regulatory body, such as the Latin American
Microfinance Association, that would develop and assist Latin American
countries to implement model legal frameworks that increase client
protection, create licensing requirements, establish interest rate caps, and
recognize microfinance institutions as part of the formal lending sector. This
framework is based on the recommendations of Verónica Trujillo-Tejada,
Victoria Muriel-Patino and Fernando Rodríguez-López (TMR Guidelines).
The suggested model framework balances the interests of “financial stability,
resilience, integrity, and consumer protection with the need to preserve
financial inclusion, innovation, and healthy competition.” Additionally, this
Note offers a comparative legal analysis and critique of the current
regulatory frameworks in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.
INTRODUCTION
Microfinance is regarded as the cure for global poverty, one that does not
require “charity, redistribution, rethinking economic policy, or restructuring
existing economic institutions.” 1 Pioneered by Dr. Muhammad Yunus,
microfinance has been portrayed as a “vital way of legitimizing and
promoting capitalism in developing countries and essentially ‘bringing
capitalism to the poor.’” 2 However, microfinance operates under a largely
deregulated model and has yet to show positive impacts or an alleviation of
poverty. 3 This lack of impact is due in part to abusive interest rates, loan
shark methods of debt collection, and massive over-lending. 4 In many
countries microfinance has become a predatory loan system that further
marginalizes the people it sets out to help. 5 These people are left with
1. HUGH SINCLAIR, CONFESSIONS OF A MICROFINANCE HERETIC: HOW MICROLENDING LOST
ITS WAY AND BETRAYED THE POOR ix (2012).
2. Milford Bateman, The Age of Microfinance: Destroying Latin American Economies from
the Bottom Up 4 (Österreichische Forschungsstiftung Für Internationale Entwicklung, Working
Paper No. 39, 2013), available at http://www.networkideas.org/focus/sep2013/Microfinance.pdf.
3. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 2–3.
4. See generally id. at 5–7.
5. See id.
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insurmountable debts and in a far worse position than the one they were in
before they took out the loan. 6 As a result, broad consensus has developed
within the microfinance community calling for increased regulations and
monitoring of institutional practices. 7 However, within the microfinance
community, there is still much disagreement regarding the creation and
implementation of a proper legal framework. 8
Part I of this Note defines microfinance and its development in Latin
America. Part II identifies the legal and economic issues resulting from the
deregulation of microfinance. Next, Part III discusses the current regulatory
frameworks and constitutional guarantees of Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
Nicaragua, and Bolivia, according to the “Criteria for the Assessment of
Legal Frameworks for Microfinance” and the TMR Guidelines. 9 Part IV then
explores the areas of economic, legal, and academic debate around
strengthening regulations in the microfinance world. Part V proposes a
regional regulatory body that should be created by treaties and be empowered
to set model rules such as the TMR Guidelines; this Part also discusses the
legality and the implications of adopting such a proposed regional regulatory
body. Lastly, this Note concludes by summarizing the key issues that affect
the current unregulated microfinance market and suggests major reforms and
regulatory undertakings.
Throughout this Note, there will be mention of a fictional character by
the name of Pedrito, a hypothetical farmer who has been approved to receive
a microfinance loan to start a business. These hypothetical examples will help
to explain the complex concepts within microfinance.
I.

WHAT IS MICROFINANCE?

Microfinance is a form of banking that is geared toward the
marginalized 10 and poor, uses extremely high interest rates, and provides
small-scale financial services to clients without requiring collateral. 11
Conversely, “banks typically borrow money from clients (savings) and lend
them to other clients (borrowers, with collateral).” 12 Furthermore,
6. See id.
7. See Anne Pouchous, The Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance: Main Issues and

Progress, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/regul
ation_supervision_microfinance.pdf.
8. See id.
9. See STEFAN STASCHEN, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MICROFINANCE: A
COMPARISON OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN 11 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE 60–64 (2003), http://www.
bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/08/Regulatory-Requirements-for-Microfinance.pdf.
10. Throughout this Note, the term “marginalized” shall mean having little to no access to
primary education, little to no access to social mobility, as well as exclusion from many
opportunities as a result of geographic location and a lack of infrastructure.
11. See Miguel Jaramillo, Guide to Microfinance in Latin America, EVIDENCE AND LESSONS
FROM LATIN AMERICA 1, http://ella.practicalaction.org/wp-content/uploads/files/130410_ECO_Mi
c_GUIDE.pdf.
12. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 18.
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microfinance institutions are not funded by borrowing from clients’ savings
accounts. Instead, they are funded by large loans from multilateral
organizations. 13 These loans from multilateral organizations allow
microfinance institutions to lend money to clients like Pedrito. However,
since the institution itself is lending out money it received from a loan, it is
left without a reserve—generated from clients’ savings—to lend to other
clients. 14
For example, suppose multilateral organization A lends $1 million USD
to microfinance institution B over a period of two years at a 4% interest rate.
B’s mission is to lend to others with the understanding that they will use the
money to start a business. Now consider Pedrito—a poor farmer who would
like to start a business but is low on cash. B offers Pedrito $100 USD, with
the funds provided by A, at an interest rate of 200% to be paid over two
months. Pedrito now has a balance of $301 USD ($100 loan + 200% interest
rate) that he must repay within two months. On one hand, Pedrito is pleased
that he receives the loan—one that he would have never had access to because
of his financial circumstances. However, his excitement is short-lived
because of the high interest rate, which often results in default, and can lead
to depression and in some instances even violence.
A. SO WHAT! WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT MICROFINANCE?
One example of the detrimental effects of unmonitored lending practices
was the global economic crisis of 2008, which was in part a consequence of
reckless banking. 15 Highly “esoteric and complex financial products” were
provided to individuals who should not have been targeted for these
services. 16 A similar trend occurs in microfinance—borrowers, like Pedrito,
default on loans that should have never been serviced. However, Pedrito has
access to these loans due to largely unmonitored microfinance practices. 17
The detrimental effects of such practices were evidenced in the microfinance
meltdowns and economic crises of Bolivia and Nicaragua. 18
Theoretically, by way of microfinance, institutions issue loans that are
intended to jumpstart small businesses. However, it seems that few lending
institutions issue loans with such business expectations in mind. In fact, most
of these loans are given with the sole expectation of profiting off the interest,
rather than encouraging market and economic growth. 19 For example, these
loans are made available to the Pedritos of the world, who then use the money
for other purposes, such as paying for weddings or quinceañeras, or spending
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 8.
See id.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 8.
See generally id. at 10, 77.
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the money on things that do not yield a return or enable them to pay back the
loan. 20 In essence, institutions like B are giving Pedrito access to more lines
of credit without a proper business plan or supervision, leading to higher rates
of consumption and consumer debt. 21 Spending on credit increases Pedrito’s
poverty level because he is just as poor as he was before he took the loan, but
now has thousands of additional dollars in consumer debt, all with high
interest rates. 22
Microfinance is a “bottom pyramid business, focusing on the poor with
questionable business practices, but get[s] away with it [by using] the title
‘microfinance.’” 23 A clear indication of this phenomenon is evidenced by the
comparison of interest rates in Mexico and in the United States. In Mexico,
microfinance interest rates have gone up as high as 195% per year. 24
Meanwhile, in the United States, the average commercial bank interest rate
for a personal loan was 10% in 2017. 25 In some states, like New York, interest
rates may not exceed 16% per year. 26 In other words, in a developed country
like the United States, even in the absence of interest rate caps, commercial
banks would not get away with charging an interest rate as high as 195%,
especially if the borrower lives in extreme poverty. Yet, in a developing
country like Mexico, deregulated microfinance institutions can get away with
charging such abusive interest rates.
As family units feel the pressure of repaying the debt, they turn to their
children for help. Consequently, microfinance has been linked to incidences
of child labor. 27 As a result, children’s educational goals are hindered, thus
perpetuating the cycle of poverty. Consider again Pedrito, who only has two
months to pay back $301 USD ($100 original loan plus $201 interest). He is
a marginalized poor farmer who does not generate any additional income
from the loan and does not have access to the tools he needs to earn more
money. Thus, he relies on his children to help make ends meet.
Just as traditional banks account for risk, microfinance institutions need
to mitigate their risks when providing loans, even if their institutional
structures are different. In microfinance, for example, loans can be given to
20. See id. at 5.
21. See PovertyCure, Microfinance 101, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=_LK4XMF2u8Y.
22. See id.; see also Madeleine Morris, ‘India’s Microfinance Meltdown’ for BBC Newsnight,
YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzF6thf5GqA.
23. See Abhay N, What Are the Realities of Microfinance? Yale School of Management,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xhkuH30lxco (discussion of the state
of microfinance between Rodrigo Canales, Tony Sheldon, and Dean Karlan).
24. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 6.
25. See Consumer Credit, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federal
reserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).
26. See N.Y. Banking Law § 14-a(1) (McKinney 2012).
27. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 5–6.; see also Talks at Google, Hugh Sinclair: “Confessions
of a Microfinance Heretic”: Talks at Google, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rhdZ2RfmiXo.
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individuals or groups. Individual loans are given to one person, whereas a
group can obtain a collective loan and must repay the loan each week with
each member serving as a guarantor of one another. 28 Without mitigating the
risk of issuing these types of loans, the likelihood of collecting the
outstanding debt decreases, rather than increases. Institutions that carry out
this practice believe that it mitigates against the lack of collateral and
increases the likelihood of collecting the outstanding debt. 29 However, this
can cause greater strain on the individuals in the group. 30
The increased commercialization of microfinance, in addition to the
departure from its original purpose, calls for change. 31 Making changes to the
core practices of microfinance is the only way to ensure that each country’s
financial system has the tools to fight abusive interest rates. 32 Additionally, a
change in the way consumers are protected can help prevent fraud and
financial crimes. 33 Such changes will help to prevent another financial crisis
from occurring.
B. THE RISE OF MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA
In the 1940s and throughout most of the 1980s, Latin America depended
heavily on the importation of goods. 34 During this period, some Latin
American countries, particularly Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, began
domesticating their industries by following Argentinean economist Raul
Prebisch’s recommendation of Import-Substitution-Industrialization (ISI
model). 35 The ISI model promoted policies that “gradually replace[d] imports
of manufactured goods [with] locally-produced goods.” 36 However, because
these economic policies did not promote exports, the success of the ISI model
was limited. 37 In fact, with the intensification of the Cold War, the ISI model
was no longer serving the interests of the United States. 38
Thus, through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the
United States rejected the ISI model and any form of proactive state
intervention, and instead pressured and forced Latin American governments
to embrace neoliberal economic policies known as the “Washington

28. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 19.
29. See Tor Jansson & Mark Wenner, Financial Regulation and its Significance for

Microfinance in Latin America and the Caribbean 34 (Dec. 1997), available at http://www.gdrc.or
g/icm/govern/iadb-jansson.pdf.
30. See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 19–20.
31. See generally Pouchous, supra note 7, at 3.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Bateman, supra note 2, at 9.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 10.
38. See id.
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Consensus.” 39 Microfinance then became a popular model in Latin America
because it aimed to promote capital growth and “the efficient allocation of
resources, as well as the safety, stability, and soundness of financial
providers,” 40 rather than proactive state intervention. However, these
neoliberal economic policies “proved to be quite disastrous . . . [T]hey
precipitated massive bankruptcies and financial crises. Private banks had to
be nationalised . . . [and] a significant percentage of Latin America’s scarce
financial resources had to be channeled into (or wasted on) repaying the debts
accumulated by governments.” 41 Moreover, the new economic policies
increased the already high level of poverty, deprivation, and inequality that
existed before 1980. 42
Around this time, Dr. Muhammad Yunus saw success in Grameen Bank.
Grameen Bank is closely associated with the start of microfinance in the
1980s. 43 A general understanding of the period before “the microfinance era”
in Latin America allows one to see why Latin American soil was ripe for
promoting microfinance—it was during the height of the Cold War, when the
United States failed to overthrow Fidel Castro in Cuba, that the ISI model
was seen as a proactive state interventionist model that contradicted the
capitalist way. 44 The success of Grameen Bank was viewed as a way of
bringing capitalism to Latin America; thus, the United States committed to
providing extensive funding and technical assistance programs to start
microfinance in Latin America. 45
As a result, three types of microfinance classifications emerged in Latin
America: (1) greenfields, (2) upgrades, and (3) downscales. 46 Greenfields are
“new, specialized institutions . . . started from scratch” 47 in order to provide
financing to micro-entrepreneurs. 48 Upgrades are “regulated financial
institutions that [were once] nongovernmental organizations that operated

39. See id. (citing John Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: How much has happened?
(John Williamson ed., 1990)).
40. Veronica Trujillo-Tejada, Victoria Muriel-Patino & Fernando Rodríguez-López, How is
Microfinance Being Regulated in Latin America? 26 ENTERPRISE DEV. & MICROFINANCE 343, 344
(Dec. 2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287994101_How_is_microfinance_being_r
egulated_in_Latin_America.
41. Bateman, supra note 2, at 10.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 4.
44. See id. at 4, 9–11.
45. See id. at 4, 12.
46. See Miguel Jaramillo, Latin America’s Institutional and Regulatory Innovations for
Microfinance Growth, EVIDENCE AND LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 4, http://ella.practicalacti
on.org/wp-content/uploads/files/130225_ECO_Mic_BRIEF2.pdf.
47. See id.
48. See Beatriz Marulanda & Maria Otero, The Profile of Microfinance in Latin America in 10
Years: Vision and Characteristics, ACCION INTERNATIONAL 1, 5 (Apr. 2005), http://www.microf
inancegateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-the-profile-of-microfinance-in-latin-americain-10-years-vision-characteristics-apr-2005.pdf.
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through banks.” 49 Downscales are commercial banks that aim to expand their
services 50 by “incorporating low-income segments into their clientele.” 51
II. PROBLEMS WITH MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA
A. LEGAL ISSUES
Generally, if one borrows money from an institution and a dispute arises,
there are institutional, legal, or alternative dispute mechanisms in place to
solve it. However, in the case of unregulated microfinance institutions, such
legal mechanisms are nonexistent. 52 Additionally, many borrowers are
geographically marginalized, meaning they are too far from or do not have
access to means of transportation to take advantage of dispute resolution
mechanisms. 53 Lastly, institutional governance, together with the lack of staff
training, is unable to handle the influx of complaints and costs of educating
clients about their rights to resolve disputes. 54
B. ECONOMIC CRISES
In the 1980s, microfinance was on the rise as Bolivia underwent
significant economic restructuring. 55 During the 1990s, the Bolivian
microfinance market was still relatively small, with an estimation of 232,000
eligible borrowers of “microloans.” 56 However, later research showed that
the microfinance sector had actually distributed at least 380,000 microloans
during this period. 57 This mismatch in supply of microloans, which was much
larger than the estimated size of the microfinance market, caused an
economic meltdown. 58
On July 2, 2001, associations of micro-entrepreneurs—such as farmers
and fruit vendors—“took Bolivia’s Superintendency of Banks hostage . . .
with dynamite [and] demanded forgiveness or reduction of [the] debt they

49. See Jaramillo, supra note 46, at 4 (stating that upgrades “are characterized as moving upmarket to increase profitability in countries where there are still challenges with the regulatory
environment”).
50. See id.
51. See Marulanda & Otero, supra note 48, at 5.
52. See MARITZA RODRÍGUEZ SAAVEDRA & DAMIAN VON STAUFFENBERG, PUBLIC CREDIT
REGISTRIES, CREDIT BUREAUS AND THE MICROFINANCE SECTION IN LATIN AMERICA 36, 82, 96,
108 (2013), http://www.microrate.com/media/downloads/2013/06/MicroRate-Report-Public-cred
it-registries-credit-bureaus-and-the-microfinance-sector-in-Latin-America-v2.pdf.
53. See id. at 82, 96, 108.
54. See generally id.
55. See Bateman, supra note 2, at 12.
56. See id. at 13.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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incurred through microlenders.” 59 At the heart of the issue was the overlending and deregulation that gave people like Pedrito access to quick and
cheap loans, or gave an already indebted Pedrito access to additional loans,
causing over-indebtedness. 60 As a result, Bolivia “experience[d] heightened
social unrest, with mass protests,” 61 leading to the events of July 2, 2001,
when bank employees were held hostage 62 and debtors threatened to blow up
buildings. 63 It was not until the Bolivian government implemented strict
regulations, interest rate caps, and compliance mechanisms that the Bolivian
market came to be regarded as the second best for microfinance. 64
The events in Bolivia were not isolated incidents. In 2008, predatory
lending led to the microfinance meltdown known as Nicaragua’s No Pago
Movement. The Movement was a response by farmers to the high and unfair
interest rates thrust upon them, 65 and was led by Omar Gonzalez Vilchez,
whose speech encouraged protests that spread over ten miles and blocked the
Pan-American Highway. 66 These protests grew increasingly violent and
culminated in an attempt to burn down one of the microfinance institution
buildings. 67
III. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN LATIN AMERICA
There are three main schools of thought regarding “best practices” for
microfinance regulators: the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the
Americas (ASBA); the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS);
and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). 68 The TMR
59. ELISABETH RHYNE, CRISIS IN BOLIVIAN MICROFINANCE 1 (2001), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/blog/Roodman%20open%20book/Rhyne,%20Crisis%20in%20Bolivian
%20Microfinance.pdf.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 2.
62. One hundred people were held hostage for ten hours; some had dynamite tied to their bodies.
When police attempted to enter, the debtors threw dynamite off the roof to keep them away.
Hostages were also taken at the Office of the Public Defender. Five hours later, a human rights
group was able to create dialogue between the debtors and various financial entities. It was not until
the financial institutions agreed to change their loan agreements that the debtors released ninetyfour hostages. Six remained to guarantee that the changes would be made. See Bolivia: Deudores
Mantienen Ocupada Superintendencia de Bancos en La Paz, COOPERATIVA (July 3, 2001),
http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/mundo/bolivia-deudores-mantienen-ocupada-superintendenciade-bancos-en-la-paz/2001-07-03/163400.html [hereinafter COOPERATIVA].
63. See RHYNE, supra note 59, at 2.
64. See Bateman, supra note 2, at 13.
65. See Elizabeth Minchew, A Movement to Acknowledge: The Nicaraguan Movimiento No
Pago, MICROFINANCE FOCUS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.microfinancetransparency.com/evide
nce/PDF/12.5%20MF%20Focus%20no%20pago%20article.pdf.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 346 (“CGAP [] focuses on the design of the
regulatory and supervisory frameworks for microfinance and the performance of private players,
including NGOs. ASBA . . . analyses the appropriateness of applying the recommendations issued
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Guidelines, created by Verónica Trujillo-Tejada, Victoria Muriel-Patino and
Fernando Rodríguez-López (TMR Guidelines), are the most comprehensive
standard for best practices for microfinance regulations in Latin America.
The TMR Guidelines put together the most appropriate recommendations
from ASBA, BCBS, and CGAP, and set forth a regulatory framework
specific to the Latin American region. 69 The guidelines are divided into seven
major categories: (1) capital requirements in the legal framework, (2) risk
management regulation, (3) institutional issues related to ownership and
governance (NPRs), (4) consumer protection regulation, (5) licensing and
property, (6) public law, and (7) microfinance supervision. 70
Financial systems that are part of legal frameworks, like traditional
banks, are controlled and monitored by “prudential” and “non-prudential”
regulations. Prudential regulations (PRs) are regulations that are “designed
to protect the system[s] integrity by preventing systemic risk” 71 and
protecting depositors’ savings. On the other hand, non-prudential regulations
(NPRs) focus on guiding business behavior. 72 For example, NPRs seek to
implement regulations that promote good behavior in the markets. 73 Both
PRs and NPRs can be implemented in order to enhance protection of the
financial institution and deposit holder or promote responsible practices. 74
However, PRs are designed to preserve the financial sustainability of
microfinance institutions and financial systems, 75 whereas NPRs focus on the
development of microfinance institutions. 76
It is important to note that the constitutions and regulatory frameworks
of these countries adopt the concept of positive human rights, as opposed to
negative human rights. Positive human rights, common in developing
countries, create an affirmative duty for the government to act, 77 such as to

by the [BCBS] to the microfinance industry. . . . BCBS . . . analyses the specific features of
microfinance activities and relates them to the Basel regulation principles.”).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 346–50.
71. Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 345.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See generally Hugh Breakey, Positive Duties and Human Rights: Challenges, Opportunities
and Conceptual Necessities, 63 POL. STUD. 1198 (2015).
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provide food security, 78 adequate housing, 79 or access to sports. 80 On the
other hand, the concept of negative human rights, common in developed
countries, focuses on prohibitions, 81 such as the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 82 The constitutional guarantees present
in each country further emphasize the importance of addressing the problems
of abuse and lack of transparency in lending. The sections that follow
highlight the constitutional protections that Pedrito has in different countries
and shed light on the different legal aspects of microfinance-related issues.
Importantly, microfinance frameworks exist on a spectrum, with highly
regulated markets like Bolivia on one end, moderately regulated markets like
the Dominican Republic in the middle, and deregulated markets like
Nicaragua on the other end.
A. DEREGULATED: NICARAGUA
The Nicaraguan Constitution sets up the Banco Central de Nicaragua as
the country’s financial regulator. 83 Article 99 gives the State the primary
responsibility of guaranteeing economic and social democracy, and
recognizes microenterprises as one of the vehicles of economic
development. 84 Nicaragua has the second least-regulated 85 microfinance
market system in the region and has only implemented twenty-nine PRs. 86 In
2011, the country passed Ley de Fomento y Regulación de las
Microfinanzas 87 (FRM), which specifically regulated nongovernmental

78. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (Braz.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN
NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 16 (Bol.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL
[CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 54 (Dom. Rep.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. III, art. 63, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9
January 1987.
79. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (Braz.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN
NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 19 (Bol.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL
[CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 59 (Dom. Rep.); see also CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. III, art. 64, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9
January 1987.
80. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 217 (Braz.); see also
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 104 (Bol.); see also
CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 65 (Dom. Rep.); see also
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. IV, ch. III, art. 65, LA
GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987.
81. See Breakey, supra note 77, at 1198.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE NICARAGUA [CN.] tit. VI, art. 99, LA
GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987.
84. See id.
85. Costa Rica has the least regulated microfinance market system in the region. See TrujilloTejada et al., supra note 40, at 355.
86. See id. at 355.
87. “Law of Encouragement and Regulation of Microfinance”
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microfinance organizations. 88 This law was intended to promote good
corporate governance and regulate microfinance institutions through the
Comisión Nacional de Microfinanzas. 89
The country has incorporated fifteen PRs in the FRM. 90 Of the PRs that
have been incorporated, it is concerning that there are no mechanisms for
solvency 91 and that half of the recommended measures against credit risk are
missing, such as maximum loan size requirements and simplifying the
required documentation for borrowers. 92 Moreover, there are no measures for
setting stricter requirements on the maximum loan size. 93 Furthermore, with
the implementation of only nine NPRs in the FRM, 94 the country performs
poorly in consumer protection. 95 The absence of simple and low-cost
mechanisms to resolve consumer complaints is a major concern. 96
Additionally, the standards that are in place for consumer rights are not
enforced, even though government agencies are intended to ensure
compliance. 97 Furthermore, neither regulated nor deregulated financial
systems utilize the infrastructure in place to handle consumer complaints. 98
Consumers can only lodge complaints in the country’s capital, leaving the
majority of consumers, who are located en el interior 99 and live far from the
capital, without a place to bring and resolve their disputes. 100
B. MODERATELY REGULATED
1. Brazil
Brazil was the first Latin American country exposed to microfinance. 101
Between 1995 and 2011, the Brazilian government “took an active role in
88. See Ley No. 769, 9 June 2011, Ley de Fomento y Regulación de las Microfinanzas, LA
GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 11 July 2011 (Nicar.).
89. “National Commission of Microfinance;” see id.
90. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 355.
91. See id. at 352.
92. See id. at 351.
93. See id. at 353.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 108.; see also Ley No. 769, 9 June
2011, Ley de Fomento y Regulación de las Microfinanzas, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 11
July 2011 (Nicar.).
98. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 108.
99. “In the interior.” This term refers to individuals who have difficulty accessing the capital
because of physical distance, lack of financial or vehicular resources, or lack of infrastructure such
as bridges and unpaved roads, among other reasons.
100. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 108.
101. See Crystal Folmar, Microfinance Regulation and Promotion Policies in Latin America: An
Analysis of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina, 5 (Dec. 14, 2015) (unpublished thesis, University
of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs), http://www.academia.edu/215
16144/MICROFINANCE_REGULATION_AND_PROMOTION_POLICIES_IN_LATIN_AME
RICA.
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formulating and introducing public policies to provide credit to low-income
populations.” 102 Among these pubic policies was Lei 11.110, 103 which
allowed for specialized microfinance institutions and created the National
Bank for Social Development. 104 Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution sets
out the eradication of poverty and social inequalities as a fundamental
objective of the government. 105 Additionally, Article 170 states the
proposition that the Constitution ensures everyone a life of dignity, with
guiding principles of social justice. 106 These principles include preferential
treatment for small enterprises. 107 Furthermore, Article 173 suggests an
affirmative duty to disallow arbitrary increases of profits in public
companies. 108 All in all, Pedrito’s microenterprise is given developmental
rights and guarantees, but problems related to the commercialization of
microfinance, such as arbitrary profits, are seemingly condoned through the
lack of explicit restrictions.
In 1999, the Brazilian Congress passed Lei 9.790. 109 Lei 9.790 was the
first legislation designed to regulate microfinance operations that created two
regulated microfinance entities. 110 Since then, the Brazilian congress has
passed a series of regulations in an attempt to promote development in the
microfinance sector. 111 Overall, “[a]lthough[ ] there are some rules for the
microfinance sector, they are very recent and insufficient to promote its
development. The microcredit programs run by the central government have
had limited success.” 112 To further understand this, an analysis of the current
PRs and NPRs is required.
Brazil has only enacted eighteen PRs. 113 It has adopted all but one of the
minimum capital requirements, which recommends additional capital
amounts for unexpected losses and fluctuations. 114 Additionally, there are
mechanisms in place for credit risks, such as differentiating microfinance

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 12.
See Lei No. 11.110, de 25 de Abril de 2005, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, Abril 2005 (Braz.).
See Folmar, supra note 101, at 12.
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (Braz.).
See id. at art. 170.
See id.
See id. at art. 173.
See Lei No. 9.790, de 23 de Março de 1995, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, Março 1995
(Braz.).
110. See Folmar, supra note 101, at 12; see also SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note
52, at 41.
111. See Folmar, supra note 101 at 12–13 (discussing Lei No. 10.194, regulations covering
deposit accounts, and Decreto No. 226, which created a national organization and a permanent
source of financial resources for microfinance institutions); see also Lei No. 10.194, de 14 de
Fevereiro de 2001, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, Março 1995 (Braz.); see also Decreto No. 226, de
29 de Novembro de 2004, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 29.11.2004 (Braz.).
112. SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 41.
113. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 355.
114. See id. at 352.
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from other financial services and implementing loan maximums. 115 All
recommendations regarding market risks, licenses, deposit insurance and
internal control, and audits have been enacted. 116 However, more needs to be
done. For example, there should be solvency mechanisms in place, and the
documentation requirements for borrowers need to be simplified. Moreover,
there are no PRs to mitigate against liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and
operational risks—making microfinance institutions weaker in the event of a
financial crisis. 117
Turning to NPRs, Brazil has implemented eleven recommendations. 118
In addition to there being small claims courts, each financial institution
handles debtor claims in-house. 119 While there are guidelines in place to
resolve debtor complaints, 120 Brazil can further strengthen consumer
protection and institutional transformation regulations by incorporating
special protection for microfinance borrowers rather than commercial bank
borrowers in the Consumer Protection Code. 121
On another note, Brazil has “excellent data collection . . . with a majority
of microfinance institutions reporting to credit bureaus.” 122 Not only is there
legislation in place, but the regulations are also “clear and have predictable
consequences for the participants in the credit reporting system.” 123
2. Dominican Republic
Overall, in the Dominican Republic, “[t]he legal framework is clear,
though it is poorly disseminated . . . [H]owever, the challenge remains to
adequately attend consumers within the unregulated financial system.” 124
Since the collapse of three large banks in 2003, 125 there has been stricter
standardization of the financial sector. 126 Nevertheless, there are not enough
PRs and NPRs in place to develop a more successful microfinance
environment.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 352, 347.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 353.
See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 47.
The Consumer Protection Code describes the complaint process and establishes the National
Consumer Defense System to help local consumers throughout the complaint process. See Lei No.
8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, Setembro 1990 (Braz.).
121. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 42, at 353; see also Client Protection in Brazil, CTR.
FOR FIN. INCLUSION, http://www.centerforfinancialinclusion.org/publications-a-resources/clientprotection-library/101-summary-of-client-protection-in-brazil (last visited Sept. 28, 2017); Lei No.
8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 1990, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, Setembro 1990 (Braz.).
122. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 48.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 122.
125. See Manuel Jiménez, Citan Causas Quiebra Bancos 2003, HOY DIGITAL (Apr. 1, 2005),
http://hoy.com.do/citan-causas-quiebra-bancos-2003-2/.
126. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 123.
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The Dominican Republic lies in the middle of the regulated microfinance
spectrum. The principal legislation, La Ley Monetaria y Financiera 127
(LMF), applies to all financial institutions. 128 The LMF does not have any
microfinance-specific sections or rules. 129 However, the Dominican Republic
Constitution sets out several guarantees for micro-borrowers like Pedrito. For
example, Article 222 of the Constitution guarantees the creation of
environments that incentivize the development and protection of
microenterprises by providing access to financing, technical assistance, and
training. 130 Additionally, Article 217 strongly suggests an emphasis on
economic development through the promotion of human development via
“economic growth, redistribution of wealth, social justice . . . [and] equality
of opportunities.” 131
The Constitution sets out the Junta Monetaria as the regulatory
agency. 132 Through resolutions, the Junta Monetaria creates rules for the
monetary and financial system. 133 The main characteristics of the financial
system are as follows: (1) a supervisory entity, 134 (2) a public credit registry,
(3) two private credit bureaus, 135 (4) a regulatory body to monitor
compliance, 136 and (5) reporting mechanisms. 137 The most recent resolution
is the Resolución Proyecto de Reglamento de Microcreditos 138 (RPM), which
establishes norms and guidelines for the administration of microfinance and
proposes a legal framework based on international best practices and PRs. 139
The country has implemented eighteen PRs in the RPM. 140 The
regulatory framework needs to better address entry requirements for new
microfinance institutions. The RPM does not set forth an absolute amount of
minimum capital requirement and only considers the maximum amount of
127. “Monetary and Financial Law”
128. See Ley No. 183-02, 21 Noviembre 2002, Que Aprueba La Ley Monetaria y Financiera [Ley

No. 183-02], 10187 G.O. (Dom. Rep.).
129. See id.
130. See CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 222 (Dom. Rep.).
131. See id. at art. 217.
132. See Ley No. 183-02, 21 Noviembre 2002, Que Aprueba La Ley Monetaria y Financiera [Ley
No. 183-02], 10187 G.O. (Dom. Rep.).
133. See id. at art. 4(f); “Resolution” (R) is the formal name of the rulemaking power of the Junta
Monetaria. The term “rules” is utilized to refer to the outcome generated by the individual aspects
of all Rs, as each R regulates the behavior and institutional requirements of all financial institutions,
just as a “rule” would. See id.
134. The supervising entity is el Banco Central de la República Dominicana (the Central Bank).
See id.
135. The private credit bureaus are Transunion and Datacrédito. See SAAVEDRA & VON
STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 123.
136. The Junta Monetaria is the regulatory body. See Ley No. 183-02, 21 Noviembre 2002, Que
Aprueba La Ley Monetaria y Financiera [Ley No. 183-02] art. 1, 10187 G.O. (Dom. Rep.).
137. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 123.
138. “Draft Resolution of Microfinance Regulation”
139. See Administración Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria, tit. 1, cap. 1, art. 1, de 27 de
junio de 2013 (Dom. Rep.).
140. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 355.
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loan possible as microcredit. 141 Moreover, the RPM does not describe the
type of documentation needed to be considered a microfinance institution,
nor does it impose requirements on becoming a corporation. 142 These
documentation and licensing requirements are important when overseeing
microfinance institutions and ensuring that these institutional structures are
in compliance with the RPM. 143 However, the LMF does set out the
institutional, legal, and evidentiary requirements for becoming an “entidad
de intermediación financiera” 144—entities such as commercial banks,
cooperatives, credit unions. 145 Nonetheless, this legal framework is
ineffective because it does not address the lack of regulation in the
microfinance sector. 146 The Dominican Republic needs to set forth
regulations that address solvency and develop more measures to mitigate
against liquidity risk, interest rate risk, operational risk, and credit risk. 147
That said, the Dominican Republic meets all requirements with regard to
market risk, licensing, permitted activities, deposit insurance, and internal
controls and audits. 148
With respect to NPRs, the Dominican Republic has only enacted ten
recommendations. 149 The country performs poorly in the “third-parties-asagents” category—they do not regulate the use of third parties, nor is there
regulation of the payment systems between traditional and small financial
institutions. 150 More can be done with licensing requirements. 151 For
example, periodic risk assessments of microfinance institutions can be
implemented as well as periodic evaluations and trainings for credit
officers. 152
The Dominican Republic has sufficient regulatory requirements and
guidelines under the RPM to satisfy the “main sources of information for the
supervisory authority” category. 153 Under Article 39 of the RPM,
microfinance institutions are required to send monthly reports to the

141. See Administración Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria, tit. 2, cap. 1, de 27 de junio de
2013 (Dom. Rep.).
142. See id.; LMF imposes requirements in order to become a commercial bank but does not
address how to establish a microfinance institution. Since RPM intends to regulate microfinance
institutions, it should impose requirements and lay out how to become one. If not, anyone could
create a microfinance institution.
143. See STASCHEN, supra note 9, at 61.
144. Translated as “Financial Intermediary or Financial Institution.”
145. See Ley No. 183-02, 21 Noviembre 2002, Que Aprueba La Ley Monetaria y Financiera [Ley
No. 183-02] sección 5, tit. 3, sección 1., art. 34, 10187 G.O. (Dom. Rep.).
146. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 122.
147. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 351–52.
148. See id. at 355.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 353.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 349.
153. See SAAVEDRA & VON STAUFFENBERG, supra note 52, at 123.
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superintendencia de bancos. 154 Moreover, Article 41 outlines the minimum
requirements for the monthly reports, which include information about the
businesses, applications and approvals, loan agreements, disclosure
statements, and outstanding balances, among other items. 155 These regulatory
requirements are important because they have the power to increase or
decrease the effectiveness of monitoring microfinance institutions. Without
this information, the superintendencia de bancos cannot ensure that
microfinance institutions are complying with all laws and regulations.
C. HIGHLY REGULATED: BOLIVIA
Bolivia’s Constitution sets out an array of constitutional guarantees that
can be applied in the context of microfinance for potential borrowers like
Pedrito. For example, Article 8 of the Constitution grants fundamental rights
such as equality, inclusion, transparency, equality of opportunity, social
justice, and the distribution and redistribution of social wealth; 156 Article 14
prohibits discrimination based on economic or social condition; 157 and
Articles 47 and 318 state that microenterprises will receive special protection
from the state and preferential allocation of financial resources to promote
their business. 158 Additionally, Article 306 assures economic development
through the equitable redistribution of economic surplus, 159 and Article 313
sets out goals to eliminate poverty and economic exclusion. 160 These guiding
principles have contributed to the legal structure and regulatory framework
of Bolivia’s microfinance industry. By taking a “larger role in shaping the
financial system” 161 and making microfinance a priority, 162 Bolivia earned its
right to be ranked in the top ten microfinance markets in the world in 2014
and 2015. 163
154. “Banking Supervisory Agency.” The Banking Supervisory Agency is a completely
autonomous institution that oversees all financial institutions and ensures that all laws, regulations
and decrees are being carried out. See Ley No. 183-02, 21 Noviembre 2002, Que Aprueba La Ley
Monetaria y Financiera [Ley No. 183-02], 10187 G.O. (Dom. Rep.); see also Administración
Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria, tit. 6, cap. 1, art. 39, de 27 de junio de 2013 (Dom. Rep.).
155. See Administración Monetaria y Financiera Junta Monetaria, tit. 6, cap. 3, art. 41, de 27 de
junio de 2013 (Dom. Rep.).
156. See CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 8 (Bol.).
157. See id. at art. 14 (Bol.).
158. See id. at arts. 47, 318.
159. See id. at art. 306.
160. See id. at art. 313.
161. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, GLOBAL MICROSCOPE 2015: THE ENABLING
ENVIRONMENT FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION 62 (2015),
https://centerforfinancialinclusionblog.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/eiu_microscope_2015_web.p
df.
162. See CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 318 (Bol.); see also
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 161, at 62.
163. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 161, at 10 (Bolivia ranked as number 8);
see also THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, GLOBAL MICROSCOPE 2014: THE ENABLING
ENVIRONMENT FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION 10, 12 (2014), http://www.citi.com/latinamerica/en/co
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Bolivia has implemented more PRs than any other country in the region,
with twenty-two PRs. 164 The country performs particularly well in minimum
capital requirements, credit risk, market risks, licensing, deposit insurance,
and internal control and audits. 165 However, Bolivia can enhance its PRs by
implementing solvency requirements and instituting higher liquidity
requirements for microfinance, softening reserve requirements, and setting
limits to large funding from one source. 166 In doing so, microfinance
institutions will be further strengthened and protected from financial crisis.
Bolivia has also implemented the most NPRs in the region, with sixteen
regulations. 167 All of the recommendations regarding consumer protection,
third-party-as-agents measures, property and governance, and institutional
transitions have been implemented; however, Bolivia performs very poorly
in the financial crimes regulations indicator, where it has not implemented
any regulations. 168
IV. CONTENTIOUS AREAS IN STRENGTHENING
REGULATIONS
The “main objective[s] of these international norms are to prevent a
systemic failure of the financial system and protect depositor savings.” 169 But
is there really a benefit to increased regulation in the microfinance market
when doing so is costly and may interfere with the free market system?
At the heart of the debate is the question, “at what point does government
interference in the microfinance industry become overly expansive, crippling
and contrary to the free market system?” 170 At the same time, however, “free
markets . . . need a legal framework that protects property, enforces contracts
and allows free exchange to flourish.” 171 Whether and how these conflicting
mmunity/data/2014_Global_Microscope-EN.pdf (Bolivia ranked as number 7); but see THE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, GLOBAL MICROSCOPE 2016: THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION 28, 29 (2016) http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx
?fi=EIU_Microscope_2016_English_web.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Microscope2016
(In
2016, Bolivia moved down in the ranks to tie for 13th place.).
164. See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 351–52.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 353.
168. See id.
169. Pouchous, supra note 7, at 3.
170. See Stephen F. Copp, The Legal Foundations of Free Markets, in THE INST. OF ECON. AFF.,
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE MARKETS, 19, 20 (Stephen F. Copp ed., 2008).
The essence of a free market is that it is one where parties can compete freely through voluntary
exchange on terms settled by agreement, on their own or with others, free from interference with
their person or their property. Because free markets are based on the economists’ model of perfect
competition that can lead to a Pareto-optimal (i.e. first best) outcome, they offer a real hope of
increased economic prosperity. The behavio[]r consistent with free markets is not an accident but
the product of laws, based on strong moral foundations.
Id.
171. Id. at 13.
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theories apply to microfinance is a question that lingers as microfinance
remains a largely deregulated sector. Here, each section poses questions
surrounding the debate, highlights the issues and consequences of
deregulation, adopts these guidelines, 172 and classifies them into the
following categories of concern: (1) protecting the country’s financial
system, (2) rapid growth and fast commercialization, (3) consumer
protection, (4) new providers and credit delivery mechanisms, (5) recent
financial crisis considerations, and (6) fraud and financial crimes
prevention. 173
A. RAPID GROWTH, FAST COMMERCIALIZATION, AND
MONOPOLIES
Should governments be allowed to interfere in the growth and
commercialization of microfinance? The microfinance sector grew at a
yearly rate of 40% from 2004 to 2008. 174 More than $60 billion USD were
accumulated in assets, with rates of return ranging between 15% and 30%.175
These profits were due in large part to microfinance institutions shifting their
focus paradigm from pro-poor outreach and poverty reduction missions
funded by donors and government support, to increasing the profits of new
corporate investors who provided another source of funding. 176 As a direct
result of this switch, many microfinance institutions focused on increasing
investor profit margin to secure future funding. 177 Consequently, there was a
decrease in asset quality as “many low-income borrowers [took out] multiple
loans, the size of which was not fit to their needs, nor their repayment
capacity … [and] contributed to major repayment crisis” and loan
delinquency problems. 178
Should competition 179 and cooperative activities 180 be regulated?
Cooperative activities are horizontal arrangements whereby firms in the same
market limit competition among members by “creation of cartels” or through

172. This Note does not adopt the “PCTI” guideline, which advocates for not setting ceilings on
interest rates. Rather, this Note advocates against this recommendation and sets forth the reasoning
in Part V.
173. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 3.
174. Pouchous, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Greg Chen, Stephen Rasmussen, & Xavier Reille,
Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance, CGAP FOCUS NOTE 61, 1 (2010)).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 3–4.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Richard A. Epstein, Unilateral Practices and the Dominant Firm: the European
Community and the United States, in THE INST. OF ECON. AFF., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE
MARKETS 191, 191–92 (Stephen F. Copp ed., 2008) (“[C]ompetition policy” refers to the linkage
between the competitive ideal and social welfare, “independent of the choice of legal entity to house
the basic business enterprise.”).
180. See id. at 192.
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mergers and acquisitions. 181 Controlling competition via cooperative
activities is important in avoiding situations where low-income borrowers
without a sustainable plan for repayment can take out multiple loans. 182 How
much control is too much? Do these horizontal arrangements lead to
monopolies? 183 The problem with monopolizing the microfinance market is
that consumers are then left with less of a choice between institutions.
Moreover, institutions will not be incentivized to provide better services and
tools. This is particularly concerning when considering the current abusive
practices, such as extremely high interest rates.
B. CONSUMER PROTECTION
The microfinance industry excessively focused on growth and returns
instead of asset quality, increasingly utilized contracts with misleading
information, and imposed excessive interest rates. 184 Lending methods like
“group lending” 185 have led to emotional harm due to the amount of peer
pressure involved in repaying these debts. 186 Moreover, collection methods
like daily harassment, public humiliation, and social exclusion have led to
some serious concerns such as suicide and public unrest. 187
“Truth-in-lending” is one of the “most controversial regulatory debates
in microfinance.” 188 Issues, such as interest rate caps, have caused a divide
between regulators and microfinance professionals. On the one hand,
regulators “believe that capping interest rates is an appropriate way to avoid
abusive rates and promote transparency.” 189 On the other hand, most
microfinance professionals are opposed to such practices because capping
interest rates results in lower profits. 190 Moreover, where interest rate caps
have been imposed they have “resulted in lower provision of tiny loans and
more opaque pricing structures.” 191
181. See id.
182. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 4 (arguing that as a result, many borrowers were lured into

credit contracts that were clearly not adapted to their needs, which in turn contributed to the major
repayment crisis in Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua from 1997–2000).
183. Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“A privilege or peculiar advantage
vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on
a particular business trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of a whole supply of
a particular commodity.”).
184. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 4.
185. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 19 (group lending is where a group (of mainly women) gets
a collective loan and repays the loan together each week).
186. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 4.
187. See id.; see also Madeleine Morris, ‘India’s Microfinance Meltdown’ for BBC Newsnight,
YOUTUBE (June 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzF6thf5GqA; see also
COOPERATIVA, supra note 62.
188. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 10.
189. Id. at 4.
190. See id. at 11.
191. See id. at 4, 11 (citing Brigit Helms & Xavier Reille, Interest Rate Ceilings and
Microfinance: The Story So Far, CGAP OCCASIONAL PAPER 9, (Sept. 2004)) (suggesting that most
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However, this argument is flawed. Excessive interest rates do not align
with the social mission of microfinance, especially when considering their
effects on extremely poor and marginalized communities, who are forced to
pay rates of 100% or higher. 192 Surprisingly, these excessive rates are
“applied by highly profitable and stock exchange listed institutions.”193
Additionally, arguing that these institutions have higher operational costs
than conventional banks is unfounded. Even if that is the case, this is not a
severe enough burden to justify the current extreme interest rates. Part of
operating a business is finding innovative ways to lessen operational and
overhead costs, all while promoting and improving efficiency. Likewise, the
additional burdens faced by microfinance institutions, such as operating in
remote areas, processing large numbers of small loans manually, and being
located in regions with socioeconomic and political risks, are not enough to
justify interest rates as high as 195%. Microfinance institutions should be
required to disclose their lending terms and the costs associated with
borrowing, as it promotes truth-in-lending. Furthermore, the main actors
advocating against interest rate caps are the ones profiting from such abusive
interest rates. 194 As such, it is not in the self-interest of the microfinance
institution to promote economic policies that favor the consumer—here,
poor, disenfranchised, and marginalized groups.
C. NEW PROVIDERS AND CREDIT DELIVERY MECHANISMS
The rise of electronic money institutions and mobile banking present
special consumer-related concerns in microfinance. First and foremost,
mobile banking affects borrowers like Pedrito, who often lack the basic
technological skills and financial familiarity to understand how to use mobile
banking. 195 Moreover, there have been issues with “addiction” to mobile
banking. 196 These issues result when access leads to over-indebtedness, loss
of social ties between the borrower and the creditor, loss of group cohesion
in group lending programs, and data privacy issues. 197 That there are no
regulations addressing electronic money and electronic money institutions in
Latin America, much less regulations specific to microfinance, is not
surprising when industrialized countries are just now beginning to regulate
these new forms of banking. 198

regulators believe in interest rate caps and that the “biggest danger, in their view, is that policymakers will not be able to set an interest rate cap high enough to permit the development of
sustainable microcredit, which in turn would jeopardize financial inclusion services to the poor”).
192. See SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 6.
193. Pouchous, supra note 7, at 11–12.
194. See id. at 4, 11.
195. See id. at 5.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See generally id.
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D. RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS CONSIDERATIONS
Legal frameworks have to take into consideration microfinance
institutions’ ties to international financial markets (particularly those that
have now become publicly traded institutions) that are vulnerable to
turbulence in the global financial market. 199 For example, a number of
microfinance institutions were devastated by the 2008 financial crisis due to
the increased dependency on international markets for funding. 200 To
mitigate the risks associated with microfinance institutions receiving large
amounts of funding from international markets, there should be increased
PRs and supervision. Such regulations should focus on institutional
refinancing risk and foreign currency dislocations. 201
With respect to supervision in microfinance, the main concerns for these
major institutions are the inadequacy of standard supervisory tools, the costs
of supervision, and the non-financial costs linked to both regulation and
supervision. 202 However, in some microfinance institutions, such as
greenfields and upscales, these concerns about increased operational cost are
inherently flawed. For example, consider salary costs: ACCIÓN 203 director
Maria Otero earned $2 million USD; the average salary of a Chief Executive
Officer in the industry is $276,000 USD and the average bonus is $255,400
USD. 204 After taking into account the industry averages and bonuses, it
would seem there is room to account for increased overhead costs without
hurting the borrower, especially when the aim of microfinance is to benefit
the poor.
E. FRAUD AND FINANCIAL CRIMES PREVENTION
Turning to anti-fraud and financial crime regulation, it is imperative to
ask “who should be held financially or criminally liable, the institution or the
individual?” Fraud “is a willful act by [a] person internal or external to the
institution . . . [i]t can be distortion of financial statements or other records
[or] stealing of cash or other property.” 205 Fraud in microfinance stems from
199. See id. at 5.
200. See id. (stating that institutions in many Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua,

Peru and Bolivia, were hard hit by the 2008 financial crisis).
201. See id.
202. See id. at 12.
203. ACCIÓN is a greenfield, large microfinance institution that operates heavily in Latin
America.
204. See Company Overview of Compartamos Financiera S.A., BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/sTocks/private/people.asp?privcapId=117471046 (last visited
Sept. 28, 2017); see also Hugh Sinclair, Generous or Excessive Salaries at Accion?, MICROFINANCE
TRANSPARENCY BLOG (Oct. 10, 2014), http://blog.microfinancetransparency.com; see also
Pouchous, supra note 7, at 3 (citing to Greg Chen, Stephen Rasmussen, & Xavier Reille, Growth
and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance, CGAP FOCUS NOTE 61, 1 (2010)) (discussing the return on
investment to range from 15–30%).
205. Alok Kumar & Alimamy Conteh, Common Frauds in Micro Finance Institutions, 1 INT’L J.
OF ADVANCED RURAL MGMT. 11 (2015).
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several problem areas: weak corporate governance; poor accounting
practices, procedures, and policies; lack of client due diligence; weak internal
control systems, policies, and procedures; slow and circuitous judicial
processes; and fears of negative publicity. 206 It is generally accepted that
microfinance institutions should be subject to increased PRs as traditional
financial institutions are, 207 yet many PRs have not been implemented. 208
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE DEREGULATED MICROFINANCE
MARKET AND THEIR LEGALITY
A. THE LATIN AMERICAN MICROFINANCE ASSOCIATION
The region should create a Latin American Microfinance Association
(LAMA) to implement and monitor the model rules suggested in the TMR
Guidelines. The goals of LAMA would be to protect micro-borrowers and
maintain a fair market through the transparency and facilitation of
microenterprise. The current regional associations, like the Latin American
Free Trade Association and the Mercado Común del Sur, are not efficient
because they focus on trade and creating a common market. 209 Regional
oversight of microfinance institutions is especially important because a large
amount of microfinance institutions are multinational organizations. Such
oversight would allow for clearer and streamlined implementation of
regulations.
With the 2008 financial crisis in mind, LAMA would require quarterly
and yearly reporting of microfinance institutions to oversee profit margins
and lending terms. The reporting requirements would mirror those of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 10-Q and 10-K forms
for publicly held companies, except that LAMA would require reporting
from all microfinance institutions. This is not to suggest that institutions
should not profit from microfinance, but instead to place a check on the
excessive compensation that microfinance executives receive. These high
salaries are earned by charging predatory interest rates that hurt the very
people these institutions aim to empower. Such high profit-yielding purposes
are more appropriate for the for-profit corporation, rather than a business
model geared toward social benefit. It is important to reiterate that the
purpose of microfinance is to benefit micro-borrowers, not investors and
executive officers.
The proposed model rules, through the TMR Guidelines, would call for
increased PRs to develop a more transparent, credible, and successful

206.
207.
208.
209.

See id. at 12.
See generally Pouchous, supra note 7.
See Trujillo-Tejada et al., supra note 40, at 351–52.
See ASOCIACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE INTEGRACIÓN, http://www.aladi.org/sitioAladi/qu
ienesSomos.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).
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microfinance system. 210 Minimum capital requirements 211 would be set at
rates that are low enough to promote competition and high enough to allow
the funds necessary for incorporation. Capital adequacy requirements 212
would be higher than those at conventional banks. 213 Additionally, shadow
banks would be subject to PRs. Many argue that shadow banks 214 should not
be subject to PRs. 215 However, it is important to recall that shadow banks
played a role in the period leading to the financial crisis of 2008—the
“conversion of opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like, short-term
liabilities” through shadow banks “masked the amount of risk taking in the
system, and the accumulation of tail risk[,]” 216 which in turn led to a systemic
crisis. Thus, model rules would regulate shadow banks. Additionally, the
model rules would promote cooperative competition by allowing
microfinance institutions in the region to come together and set agreements
on prices, restrictions, and general industry norms. These agreements would
then be submitted to LAMA and subsequently to regulatory institutions of
each country for review.
There are different approaches to protect consumers—first, from a
practical standpoint, second, a dispute resolution standpoint, third, an
institutional reporting standpoint, fourth, interest rates, and finally, a digital
divide standpoint. Regarding practices, the model rules would focus on
solving abusive lending and collection practices through LAMA
monitoring. 217 The proposed solution adopts both soft and hard measures to
prevent abusive lending and collection practices. The soft measures include
developing professional codes of conduct for lenders, creating self-regulatory
210. See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 1 (To date, there has been no proof of a direct correlation
between poverty reduction and microfinance. In other words, in a period of almost forty years the
promise, purpose, and objectives of microfinance have yet to be seen).
211. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 7 (defined as “the lowest amount of currency that investors
can bring to the equity base of a financial institution seeking a banking license”).
212. See id. (“This ratio refers to the minimum amount of capital a financial institution should
hold to avoid solvency problems.”).
213. See id. at 8 (stating several reasons: (1) “MFIs’ portfolios tend to be more volatile than those
of commercial banks, and, accordingly, can deteriorate with surprising speed.” Additionally, “MFIs’
portfolios are usually unsecured or secured by limited—and often illiquid—assets.” (2) “[N]onrepayment events in MFIs tend to be more contagious than in a commercial bank . . . [if] a microborrower sees that other clients are not paying back their loans, his/her own incentive continues to
decline rapidly.” Consider, for example, Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua during the 1997–2000
downturns. (3) “[O]perational risks in microfinance tend to be particularly high.”).
214. See FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REP. NO. 559, SHADOW BANKING REGULATION 1
(2012),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr559.pdf
[hereinafter SHADOW BANKING REGULATION] (These institutions resemble banks as financial
intermediaries but cannot legally accept deposits. “Shadow banks contributed to the credit boom in
the early 2000s and collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007–09. . . . The shadow banking system
is a web of specialized financial institutions that channel funding from savers to investors through
a range of securitization and secured funding techniques.”).
215. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 7.
216. See SHADOW BANKING REGULATION, supra note 214, at 1.
217. See Pouchous, supra note 7, at 9.
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organizations that promote responsible lending, and creating a forum to lodge
complaints against lenders. 218 Regarding dispute resolution, each country
would need to create a mobile forum—to lodge complaints—that can move
throughout the rural areas of each country. Regarding reporting, it is
important to create credit bureaus that have access to common databases with
information on borrowers and their paying habits. 219 Hard measures such as
strict reporting requirements and increased frequency in reporting should also
be implemented. Regarding rates, the model rules propose interest rate caps,
and LAMA would oversee institutional adherence. Not only are excessive
interest rates not in line with the inherent purpose of microfinance—to
provide a way for the poor to escape poverty—they also hamper the ability
of the extremely poor and marginalized from ever removing themselves from
their existing socioeconomic positions. Regarding the digital divide, while
keeping the growing role of technology in mind, the model rules would
propose a regulatory mechanism for mobile banking that is modeled after the
European Union’s E-Money Directive, which regulates electronic money
institutions and their services through PRs. 220
LAMA would also ensure that the model rules address two concerns
associated with fraud and financial crimes: (1) securities and abusive
investment arrangements, and (2) money laundering and insider lending. 221
The model rules deal with money laundering and insider lending 222 by
restricting the amount of insider loans to a certain percentage of capital 223
and putting in place supplemental precautionary measures like increased
monitoring by third parties within the organization to increase the level of
accountability. 224 Additionally, both the employee and the institution,
pursuant to a balancing test, 225 will be subject to civil and possibly criminal

218. See id. at 10.
219. See id.
220. See Council Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267) 7, tit. 1, art. 2, para. 1–2. (“‘[E]lectronic

money institution’ means a legal person that has been granted authori[z]ation . . . to issue electronic
money . . . . ‘[E]lectronic money’ means electronically [and] magnetically . . . stored monetary value
. . . which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions . . . and
which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer.”).
221. See STASCHEN, supra note 9, at 29 (“Insider loans are ‘loans made to a person who is in a
position of influence within the lending institution, or to someone else connected with such a
person.’”).
222. See id. at 29 (suggesting that insider lending entails issues that go beyond conflicts of
interest, the loan conditions “are much more favo[]rable than for external loans, in other cases it is
simply much easier for borrowers to have their loans rescheduled or even forgiven”).
223. See id. at 30.
224. See generally id. at 34 (Author discusses how credit bureaus in Bolivia have experienced a
high level of accountability in business management and consumer protection after reporting to
third parties. This Note suggests that such a positive outcome can be possible in other behavioral
aspects of microfinance institutions.).
225. The balancing test should include concepts and factors such as respondeat superior—who
handled the loan, what position they held, the type of crime committed, and the senior
management’s level of involvement, to name a few.
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sanctions in an effort to ensure that institutions are protecting against fraud
and financial crimes. The model rules would also incorporate other
recommendations from CGAP, outside of the TMR Guidelines, such as
banning insider lending in the form of loans to employees. 226 Although not
included in the TMR Guidelines, the model rules would also suggest
regulations that require internal control mechanisms and independent
audits. 227
B. LEGALITY OF LAMA
The creation of a regional body such as LAMA is dependent upon its
constitutionality in each member country. As noted above, the governments
of Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and most of Latin
America believe in positive human rights. As such, considering the
constitutional articles that promote economic and social welfare, and the
above-listed principles promoting integration in the region, LAMA is not
only legal, but its function and purpose are in line with the spirit of these
constitutions. This section highlights the articles of the respective
constitutions that support the creation of LAMA.
In Bolivia, Article 255 sets out the guiding principles behind becoming
signatories to agreements such as LAMA. Among those principles is the
imperative of providing access to basic services for wellbeing and
development. 228 Moreover, the government commits to promote economic
integration with Latin American countries. 229 Being that microfinance is a
tool for socioeconomic development that provides the poor with access to the
formal sector of the economy through microloans for business start-ups,
LAMA would pose no legal concerns.
In Brazil, Article 4 sets forth the governing principles surrounding
international agreements and states that Brazil should seek the economic
integration of Latin America. 230 While LAMA caters to microfinance rather
than trade, it would still promote economic integration in the region through
the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. The operational aspects of
LAMA are also feasible as Article 32 allows for providing technical and
economic assistance, as well as facilitating cooperation and research in
implementing international agreements like LAMA. 231
In the Dominican Republic, the aim behind the creation of LAMA falls
squarely within Article 26 of the Constitution. Here, the Dominican
226. See CGAP, A GUIDE TO REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE CONSENSUS
GUIDELINES 32 (2012), https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Consensus-Guideline-A-Guide-toRegulation-and-Supervision-of-Microfinance-Oct-2012_0.pdf.
227. See Kumar & Conteh, supra note 205, at 15.
228. See CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 255 (Bol.).
229. See id. at art. 265.
230. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (Braz.).
231. See id. at art. 32.
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Republic: (1) commits to acting on international, regional, and national levels
for economic development; (2) promotes and favors integration with other
nations of the Americas to defend the interest of the region; (3) enters into
international treaties to promote development, and ensure welfare and
collective security, as well as delegates necessary powers to supranational
organizations to take part in the integration process; and (4) favors economic
solidarity among the Americas. 232 LAMA would be a supranational
organization that increases economic development in the region by fostering
and encouraging both upward mobility from extreme poverty to the middle
class and entry into the formal economic sector. Additionally, LAMA would
ensure that multinational microfinance institutions are regulated in
accordance with Latin America’s best interest, rather than the interests of
foreign shareholders.
In Nicaragua, Article 9 favors unity in the Latin American region and
encourages the creation of bodies, like LAMA, necessary to achieve those
goals. 233 Moreover, the Constitution states that the creation of such
organizations shall be put into effect by legislation and treaties. 234
CONCLUSION
Since many of the large microfinance institutions operate in many
countries of Latin America, a regional approach to address problems within
the microfinance industry and enforce regulations should be created.
Countries like Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua can
become signatories; LAMA can develop regional benchmarks and model
rules, and oversee their implementation in each country to create a more
uniform and balanced system of microfinance. Most of the existing
regulations are ambiguous and do not adequately address the issues specific
to microfinance.
As demonstrated by Pedrito, microfinance has proved to be more of a
problem than a solution. Pedrito’s situation is a representation of many
peoples’ financial circumstances, wherein microfinance has failed to bridge
the economic gap between the rich and poor. If microfinance institutions
continue to function in their present form, they run the risk of causing more
harm than good and betraying their original goals and purpose. However,
through proper regulation and supervision, microfinance can be a positive
critical component for economic growth in Latin America.
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